Abstract: Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) reported that lowering the weight on payroll in states' corporate income tax apportionment formulae had the potential to raise manufacturing employment. Their analyses continue to be cited in academic articles and are still influential in the policy debate. I gather data and attempt to replicate their analyses and findings. I identify an apparent but inconsequential error in G&M's sample, and I replicate the most widely cited result in the original paper. Other results are substantively but not quantitatively replicated. I show that G&M's results are sensitive to relatively arbitrary choices about the sample that is used. I argue that the most cited result in the paper does not come from the most preferred econometric specification and that when the most preferred econometric specification is used G&M's original paper found no statistically significant evidence that lowering the apportionment weight on payroll raises employment. Similarly, when I use this specification with data covering the period G&M studied (1978 to 1994), I find no statistically significant evidence for this hypothesis. When I modify the regression specification to separately include the payroll weight and the state corporate tax rate in addition to their product (i.e. state payroll burden), I find increased statistical significance when I use Huber/White standard errors. When standard errors are clustered by state, as is now common econometric practice, lowering the weight on payroll in states' corporate income tax apportionment formulae has no statistically significant impact on manufacturing employment. I do a similar analysis using more recent data and obtain similar results. In summary, econometric evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in the payroll weight affected the distribution of manufacturing employment among U.S. states in the 1978 to 1994 period appears less strong than G&M asserted even when using G&M's data and methods. More recent data also provide only weak econometric evidence in support of G&M's main hypothesis.
INTRODUCTION
Multi-state firms must "apportion" (or attribute) total (national) profit to individual states in order to comply with state corporate income tax law. Although the conceptual basis by which this attribution should be done is murky, state corporate tax codes specify formulae that must be used. Traditionally, most state tax codes required multi-state firms to apportion their profit based on equally-weighted national share of payroll, property and sales in each state. States that had higher shares of these three elements were assigned higher shares of a multi-state firm 's profits. i In recent years state policymakers have sometimes lowered the weight on payroll and property while increasing the weight on sales in the hope that the revised apportionment formulae will provide a competitive advantage over other states in attracting employment from multi-state firms. The basic idea is that, for most multi-state firms, the location of sales is determined by the location of consumers and is largely beyond the firm's control. However, the locations of payroll and property are determined by firm choice and may be sensitive to state economic incentives.
In 2000 Goolsbee and Maydew (henceforth G&M) published "Coveting thy neighbor's manufacturing: The dilemma of state income apportionment", which reported empirical results that they claimed showed that in "the average state reducing the payroll weight from one-third to one-quarter increases manufacturing employment around 1.1%." The dilemma referred to in their colorful title was that the "results also suggest [ed] Citations Index as of July 1, 2013), and continues to steadily accumulate citations more than decade after its publication.
ii Perhaps just as importantly, G&M's research on this question has been, and continues to be, influential in state policy debates.
iii With many years of thought and research and significant advances in econometric methods since the publication of G&M, it seemed worthwhile to revisit their analysis to attempt to replicate their results. The long-standing difficulties of replication in economics are well known. Hamermesh (2007) reminds us that when Dewald et al. (1986) (i)n some ways the results were encouraging: Replication uncovered what the authors believed were many minor errors, but only in a few cases were the mistakes severe enough to alter the original work's qualitative conclusions. Of course, one wonders whether those data sets that were provided were not self-selected from the upper tail of quality of empirical work, so that the apparent relative lack of major errors underestimates the general severity of difficulties with published studies.
In view of this (and similar) experiences one might expect that replication of an article that is more than a decade old to be challenging. However, the continuing importance of the debate and the continued citations of G&M's article make it a task worth undertaking.
REPLICATION OF G&M
G&M conducted empirical analysis to measure the relationship between total manufacturing employment in a state and the tax burden on payroll. This article is among the most cited empirical article on this topic and it has been influential in the public policy debate.
Because of this, I go into some detail to explain the steps I took to replicate the results. This variable is called "National employment" in G&M tables 2,4 and 5 but is called "Employment" in G&M Table 1 . Using my replication of G&M's data set, I attempted to replicate the descriptive statistics presented in their article. Overall, my replication of the descriptive statistics was quite close.
Perhaps not surprisingly I replicated the mean and standard deviation of the national unemployment rate exactly. I did not replicate the mean and standard deviation of other variables exactly, but in all cases the means are replicated within a few percentage points of those reported by G&M. In all cases, the standard deviations I calculated were higher than those reported by G&M.
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REPLICATION OF REGRESSION RESULTS IN G&M TABLE 2 USING G&M
SAMPLE
My replications of key G&M regressions are presented in Table C below. Column (1A) simply copies the results reported in column 1 of Table 2 of G&M. In column (1B) I replicate the coefficient on state payroll burden that is reported in G&M Table 2 column (1) and that G&M use in their "headline" conclusion to the third decimal place. I estimate a standard error that is about 20 percent larger than G&M, but the coefficient I estimate is nevertheless significant at a 10 percent level of confidence. The coefficients on the control variables ( mean payroll burden, state income growth and national unemployment) all have the same sign as in G&M, and all are statistically significant as in G&M; however, all three coefficients are larger in my replication. For reasons discussed below, G&M Table 2 column 3 (replicated in Table C column 3B) may be the most appealing specification from an econometric point of view. In this specification both G&M and I find a negative and statistically insignificant coefficient on state payroll burden suggesting that corporate income tax burdens are not an important determinant of the geographic allocation of manufacturing employment. The magnitude of my estimated coefficient is more than twice as large as the coefficient reported by G&M. My replication of G&M's regressions finds a negative and statistically significant coefficient suggesting a relationship between payroll weight and manufacturing employment in columns (2B). However, as discussed in more detail below this specification may be suspect since it does not control for state payroll burden which is a key independent variable.
Overall, the results from my attempt to replicate G&M's findings are encouraging. I am able to econometrically replicate the key substantive findings despite having to reconstruct a rather complex data set that is more than a decade old. In particular, I replicate the coefficient used in G&M's "headline" conclusion to the third decimal place. Some of the other estimated coefficients differ substantially in magnitude from those reported by G&M but all have the same algebraic sign and significance as in G&M. In the next section I discuss various estimation issues that may affect the interpretation of the results reported in G&M Table 2 and its replication.
DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS ESTIMATION ISSUES
Omitted Variable Bias and Misspecification
The key dependent variable in G&M's analysis is state manufacturing employment.
Their key independent variable is the state (and year) specific payroll burden, which is measured as the top state corporate income tax rate multiplied by the payroll weight. G&M also include as control variables the mean (national) payroll burden, annual state income growth, the national unemployment rate, interaction terms that allow a state-specific effect of the national unemployment rate, state specific trends, state fixed effects, and in some cases year specific effects. G&M cannot estimate coefficients on both year specific effects and variables that are constant across states in a given year since these variables would be perfectly correlated. Thus, the inclusion of year-specific effects necessitate the omission of mean payroll burden and 10 national unemployment rates. Some of G&M's results in Table 2 are reproduced in Table C (above).
G&M interpret the negative and significant coefficient on state payroll burden in column (1A) to mean that "Reducing the tax burden on payroll in the state by reducing the corporate rate or the payroll weight in the apportionment formula increases manufacturing employment significantly." However, the results in columns (3A) of the same table cast doubt on this interpretation.
The regression reported in column (3A) replaces independent variables that do not vary across states (namely Mean payroll burden and National unemployment) with year dummies.
Note that the estimated coefficient on State payroll burden in column (3A) must suffer from no more (and potentially less) omitted variable bias than the estimated coefficient on this variable in column (1A). The year dummies in column (3A) control for all variables that are constant across states but vary over time, while specification (1A) controls for only two such variables. One can think of numerous variables that might be important and are not controlled for in column (1A)
but are controlled for in column (3A). These would include new federal government regulations that influenced hiring in manufacturing, interest rates, important news events like threats of war or presidential elections, etc. Despite this G&M base their "headline result" ("reducing the payroll weight from one-third to one-quarter increases manufacturing employment around 1.1%") on the coefficient estimates from column 1.
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In column (3A) the estimated coefficient on state payroll burden is less than half as large as the estimated coefficient on this variable in column (1A), and in column (3A) the estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant. This may suggest that important year specific variables that were omitted from the regression in column (1A) were correlated with state payroll burden.
This could occur for example if payroll tax burden was particularly high in years during which manufacturing employment growth was particularly suppressed.
Turn now to columns (2A) where G&M replace the state payroll burden with separate variables for the state corporate tax rate and the payroll weight.
x In this specification the coefficient on the state corporate income tax rate is negative and statistically insignificant. G&M argue that the lack of precision with which the coefficient on the corporate tax rate is estimated might be explained by measurement error, and also could be due to lack of variation in the rate in the observed data.
Note that state payroll burden is the product of the state corporate tax rate and the state payroll weight. Economic theory as discussed in G&M suggests that the product rather than the individual components should matter since it is the product that determines the total tax burden.
Thus, economic theory predicts that, all else equal, a firm would be equally likely to locate employment in a state that had a corporate tax rate of 10 percent and a payroll weight of (0.25) so that payroll burden equals 2.5 percent, and in a state that had a corporate tax rate of 5 percent with a payroll weight of (0.50) so that payroll burden equals 2.5 percent.
Economic theory does not rule out the possibility that both the product of the corporate tax rate and the payroll weight and their individual components affect corporate location decisions. For example, if the corporate tax rate played an important symbolic role in indicating the degree to which a state was friendly to business, then it might matter independently of the payroll burden. If one believed this to be the case, then the appropriate econometric specification would be to include both the state payroll burden and its components. However, G&M do not report this. xi The specifications in G&M Table 2 columns (1) and (3) imposes an a priori zero coefficient on the corporate tax rate and the payroll weight by omitting them from the regression. In G&M Table 2 (column 2) the components of the state payroll burden are entered into the regression, but G&M impose an a priori zero coefficient on state payroll burden by dropping it from the regression. If payroll burden (the product of corporate tax rate and payroll weight) is important (as economic theory says it may be), then omitting it from the regression introduces omitted variable bias that may complicate the interpretation of the coefficients on the included variables. In particular, when there is an omitted variable the expected value of the estimated coefficients on the included variables may not be equal to the true value of these coefficients. The bias of the estimated coefficients increases with the correlation between the omitted and included variables. Since payroll burden is the product of two included variables, the omitted variable is quite likely to be correlated with included variables and therefore the estimated coefficients in G&M columns (2) may be biased.
Clustering Standard Errors
G&M's panel data contains a time series (or cluster) of observations on each state in the sample. To the extent that the within-state regressions errors are correlated the conventionally estimated standard errors on the coefficients may be too small (Wooldridge 2010) . Recent econometric practice allows for clustering when estimating the standard errors of the coefficients. This is virtually standard practice in academic literature using panel data today but
was not common when G&M published their paper in 2000. Nichols and Schaffer (2007) and sources cited therein provide details on the advantages of clustering when estimating standard errors with panel data.
Updating the Data Through 2010
13 It has been more than 13 years since G&M published their paper so that it is possible to investigate whether their findings are validated by experience with post 1994 data. Using more recent observations I am able to almost double the number of observations in the regression. corporate tax rate to the specification. Columns 3 and 4 are the same specifications as in column 1 and 2, respectively, but use a longer time series that goes through 2010. In the last three rows of all the specifications I report the implied point estimate of the percentage change in state manufacturing employment resulting from a decrease in the employment weight from one-third to one quarter and Huber/White and cluster robust standard errors on the point estimate. In the early period (columns 1 and 2) the point estimates are 1.9 and 2.9 percent depending upon the specification. The point estimates are significantly different from zero when Huber/White standard errors are used but are not significantly different from zero when cluster-robust standard errors are used. When the full period data set is used the point estimates fall to only about ninetenths of one percent and again are insignificant when cluster-robust standard errors are used.
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS OF RESULTS
The smaller impact of apportionment when using more current data is consistent with G&B's argument that single sales apportionment is essentially a zero-sum game so that its widespread adoption eventually results in small net gains to adopters. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 use the same 725 observations as in columns 1 and 2 and add data on all states except S. Dakota, Nevada, Texas, Washington, Wyoming, Alaska, Hawaii and Michigan for the years 1995 to 2010. The dependent variable in each regression is the log of manufacturing employment. Each regression includes the dummies listed at the bottom of the column and allows the coefficients on the log of national employment to vary by state. This change in dependent variable has little impact on the substantive findings.
CONCLUSION
G&M reported a statistically significant and quantitatively important impact of payroll weight in apportionment formulae on manufacturing employment. Using the sources and methods employed by G&M and some direct guidance provided by the authors, I have been able to replicate the "headline" result of the paper. It appears that G&M may have made at least one error in assembling their data (affecting seven observations). This error apparently was of minor substantive importance since the estimated coefficients (and standard errors) that I obtain are similar whether or not I correct it.
When I use G&M's sample my analysis differs quantitatively but replicates G&M's substantive results when including the state corporate tax rate and the payroll weight, separately.
I argue, however, that those results may not be econometrically appropriate since they omit a key theoretical variable-the interaction of these two variables. When I run regressions that include both the interaction term and its components separately, I find that a decrease in the payroll weight from one-third to one-quarter increases manufacturing employment 1.9 to 2.9 percent and is statistically significant when I calculate Huber/White standard errors. This reinforces G&M's key finding. However, the theoretical justification for including both the interaction term and its components is relatively weak, and, in any case, once I cluster the standard errors by state as current econometric practice would dictate, the estimated impact of changes in the payroll weight on manufacturing employment is insignificant.
When I extend the data set forward to 2010 I find that the policy change results in an increase of manufacturing employment of only about nine-tenths of one percent but continues to be statistically significant when I use Huber/White standard errors. Once again, however, the relationship is not statistical significant when standard errors are clustered by state. When payroll is substituted for employment as the dependent variable, I obtain quite similar qualitative and quantitative results.
In summary, econometric evidence to support the hypothesis that changes in the payroll weight affected the distribution of manufacturing employment among U.S. states in the 1978 to 1994 period appears less strong than G&M asserted even when using G&M's data and methods.
More recent data also provide only weak econometric evidence to support their conclusion.
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Much of the research described in this paper was done to fulfill obligations incurred by David Merriman under a contract with the National Education Association (NEA Bank Franchise Tax (SDCL 10-43): An annual tax is imposed on banks, financial institutions, and savings and loan associations based upon net income assignable to South Dakota. The tax rates are as follows: 1) 6% on net income of $400 million or less; 2) 5% on net income exceeding $400 million but equal to or less than $425 million; 3) 4% on net income exceeding $425 million but equal to or less than $450 million; 4) 3% on net income exceeding $450 million but equal to or less than $475 million; 5) 2% on net income exceeding $475 million but equal to or less than $500 million; 6) 1% on net income exceeding $500 million but equal to or less than $600 million; 7) 0.5% on net income exceeding $600 million but equal to or less than $1.2 billion; and, 8) 0.25% on net income exceeding $1.2 billion. Ninety-five percent of the taxes paid by banks organized under SDCL 51A-2-38 to 51A-2-43 are deposited in the General Fund, and five percent of the taxes collected are returned to the county where the bank or financial institution is located. Twenty-six and two-thirds percent of all other revenues collected from the tax are deposited in the General Fund and seventy-three and one-third percent are remitted to the county where the bank or financial institution is located. 
